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There are reasons to believe that there is increased popularity of trading in the closing auction 
due to the growth of index investing. We use intraday trading data from the Oslo Stock 
Exchange to examine and test the following hypotheses: (1) index investing drives closing 
auction turnover, and the turnover of stocks in the OSEBX and OBX Index is significantly 
higher during the closing auction relative to the remaining stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
and (2) prices deviate at the close and reverse overnight. Our results show that the turnover of 
stocks in the OSEBX and OBX are significantly higher than the remaining stocks during the 
closing auction. Further, prices do deviate at the close and reverse almost entirely overnight. 
Nevertheless, the use of the closing auction on the Oslo Stock Exchange might be more 
influenced by opening trends of the American stock market than index investing.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the implications of the Oslo Stock 
Exchange closing auction on underlying stocks and conducts analyses to investigate whether 
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1. Introduction 
There is a considerable amount of literature analyzing the rise of index investing. However, 
only a few papers investigate the popularity of increasing closing auction trades and link the 
increased trading volume during the closing auction to increased trading of index funds and 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs). To our knowledge, no research has examined the closing 
auction on the Oslo Stock Exchange nor conducted the possible relationship between the 
closing auction and rise in index investing in Norway. Consequently, we aim to contribute to 
the current financial literature in both a national and global context. 
By analyzing Norwegian intraday stock data combined with index fund data from the 
Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF), price data from the VSTOXX 
volatility index, and price data of U.S. indices, we investigate the drivers behind and the 
relationship between index investing and the closing auction on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Our first hypothesis states that index investing drives closing auction turnover. Additionally, 
we hypothesize that the turnover of stocks in the OSEBX and OBX is significantly higher 
during the closing auction relative to the remaining stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We 
use panel regressions with fixed effects estimation to test this hypothesis and find that closing 
auction turnover is significantly higher for stocks in OSEBX and OBX than for the remaining 
stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Moreover, the results indicate that auction turnover is 
higher on the last day of the month. However, OSEBX rebalancing days barely impact stocks 
included in the OBX Index significantly, and no significant change in auction turnover on 
OBX rebalancing days is discovered. 
Secondly, we hypothesize that prices deviate at the close and reverse overnight. We include 
date fixed effects instead of stock fixed effects in the auction price deviation panel regression 
model and find that a higher auction turnover corresponds to a higher absolute price deviation. 
We find that aggregate risk drives a large portion of the price deviation and find that the price 
deviations are significantly higher for the smallest stocks and decrease with size, meaning that 
price deviations are lowest for stocks in OBX. Furthermore, 75% of the return from the end 
of ordinary trading to end of the closing auction is reversed by 10:00 the next morning. More 
than 95% of the price deviation in the closing auction is reversed overnight for stocks included 
in OSEBX and OBX.  
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To summarize, our hypotheses are supported, and the results are consistent with the area of 
literature that argues that the closing auction has gained importance. Nevertheless, we remain 
careful to conclude whether index investing directly drives closing auction turnover. We argue 
that as trading volume shifts from the continuous intraday sessions to the closing auction, 
institutional investors might be better off allowing larger tracking errors and rebalance their 
portfolios outside the auction.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In the remaining part of section 1, we 
develop hypotheses based on theoretical background on the increase in index investing and 
closing auctions. Thereafter, relevant research will be presented in a literature review. Section 
2 provides a description of data, how the data is processed, and the construction of variables. 
Section 3 presents empirical methods used in the analyses and corresponding assumptions. In 
section 4, we present our empirical results before discussing the findings in section 5. Lastly, 
section 6 summarizes and concludes, and we provide suggestions for potential focus areas for 
further research.  
1.1 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
Index investing is a passive investment strategy that attempts to replicate the returns of an 
established market benchmark. Investors may implement this strategy by holding the 
component securities of the indices' or investing in an index fund or exchange-traded fund 
(ETF), which in turn replicates the performance of a specific index. Both options offer 
diversification benefits, but the major difference between investing in an index fund and an 
ETF is that ETFs are listed on an exchange in the same way as a stock. Consequently, the 
apparent advantage over traditional index funds is that investors can buy and sell ETFs 
throughout the day at the observed market price. ETFs have become very popular among 
investors and traders and are now dominating the U.S. fund market. As opposed to the U.S. 
equity market, only four ETFs are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Index investing in the 
U.S. has in general grown extraordinarily over recent years in terms of the number of ETFs 
offered and as well as of total net assets under management. The total net assets of both index 
mutual funds and ETFs reached $10.2 trillion by the end of 2020, where index ETFs accounted 
for $5.4 trillion and index mutual funds accounted for $4.8 trillion – which was up from $619 
billion in 2005 (ICI, 2021). A factor that has contributed to the growing investor preference 
for index funds in recent years is a better performance record than actively managed 
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investment funds. As Sushko and Turner (2018) pointed out, recent experience corresponds 
with empirical literature, which suggests that after fees and expenses, the average active equity 
funds have failed to outperform their market benchmark over longer time perspectives. A 
significant increase and popularity in index investing have been present during recent years in 
Norway as well. As seen in Figure 1, data from the Norwegian Fund and Asset Management 
Association (VFF) show that Norwegian index funds' capital under management has increased 
from approximately NOK 42 million in 2003 to NOK 22.35 billion by the end of 2019. 
Moreover, the number of customer relationships has in the same period increased from 249 to 




Figure 1: The evolution of index funds' capital under management expressed in 1,000 NOK from 2003 
to the end of 2019, registered by VFF (VFF, 2021). 
 
A closing auction is a batch auction that occurs at the end of the trading day for setting the 
closing price for every security. On U.S. exchanges, closing prices are most commonly set 
through market-on-close orders, which are scheduled to be traded in the closing auction 
regardless of the trading price. At the NYSE, traders can enter market-on-close orders from 
07:00 until 15:45 and can only modify or cancel the orders in case of an error. On the Nasdaq, 
market-on-close orders must be submitted by 15:50. At 16:00, both exchanges close for the 
day, and auctions are run for all orders. Shortly after that, closing prices for securities and 
indices are published. On the Oslo Stock Exchange, the continuous trading closes at 16:20, 
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and the final closing auction starts immediately. From 16:20, traders are allowed to place, 
change and delete orders until 16:25. After 16:25, all orders will be matched and closed within 
30 seconds. The closing auction price is the most important stock price of the day for listed 
companies and institutional investors. The prices serve as reference prices for pricing 
derivative contracts, computing benchmarks and portfolio returns, and calculating a fund’s net 
asset value (NAV).  
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) show that the closing auction has become a great trading 
mechanism that has increased significantly in importance and activity during recent years. In 
2010, the closing auction in the U.S. equity market accounted for 3.11% of the daily trading 
volume. In 2018, this number had grown to 7.48% (Bogousslavsky & Muravyev, 2020), and 
in 2019 the share trading volume at the end of the day had increased further to about 11% (Wu 
& Jegadeesh, 2020). On Euronext Paris, CAC 40 stocks traded close to 41% during the closing 
auction in June 2019 (Raillon, 2020). In developed countries of Europe, closing auctions 
represented as much as 21% of the trading day activity as of January 2020 (Novick et al., 
2020). By using intraday stock data from our sample period, 26.8.2019 to 4.12.2020, we find 
that closing auction volume on the Oslo Stock Exchange has accounted for 23.45% of the daily 
trading NOK volume.  In this thesis, we wish to analyze if the same shift towards trading in 
the closing auction is likely to be present for the Norwegian stock market and further 
investigate the corresponding drivers behind the closing auction.  
Literature suggests that one important factor for the growth of closing auctions is the growth 
of index investing. Investors strive to minimize tracking errors by trading at the closing auction 
because closing prices often set their benchmarks. Institutional investors are benchmarked 
with month-end prices, something that further encourages them to trade at the close. 
Additionally, the development of algorithmic and high-frequency trading has also contributed 
to the growth of closing auction volume. Bogousslavsky & Muravyev (2020) found that 
closing auction turnover is 87% higher on the last day of the month. This result suggests that 
the increase in closing auction volume may be strongly associated with ETF ownership and is 
mainly driven by indexing and institutional rebalancing. Hence, closing volume behaves 
differently from intraday volume.  
Empirical findings show that closing auction volume is growing, is mostly uninformed, and 
shifts prices (Bogousslavsky & Muravyev, 2020). Models developed by Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) anticipated that a congregation of trades, that are not based on firm-specific 
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information, at specific times during the day should reduce costs and make prices more 
efficient. Furthermore, theory predicts that intraday liquidity may deteriorate if traders cluster 
their trades around times of higher liquidity (Foster & Viswanathan, 1990). Liquidity drying 
up during the rest of the intraday may be a concerning trend as the opening period is crucial 
for pricing in overnight news. An effect where liquidity induces liquidity predicts to cause 
informed traders to strategically pool with these uninformed traders to minimize the price 
impacts of their trades (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988), which means that market participants are 
attracted to the price efficiency and the liquidity that the closing auction offers. 
In this thesis, we wish to analyze some of the implications increased index investing imposes 
on the closing auction and the corresponding effects on underlying stock dynamics and 
liquidity. At the close, we expect higher turnover for stocks included in indices. Thus, we 
propose the first hypothesis: 
 
1. Index investing drives auction turnover, and the turnover of stocks in the OSEBX 
and OBX Index is significantly higher during the closing auction relative to the 
remaining stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
If the hypothesis proves to be valid, it would also be consistent with the motivation and goal 
of passive institutional investors for minimizing tracking error. Additionally, there is a 
seemingly changing mix and concentration of market participants that drive the shift towards 
the closing auction.   
As literature suggests that increased index investing seemingly shifts trading volume towards 
the close, high closing auction volume distorts closing prices. Our next aim for this thesis is 
to investigate whether the same result is valid for the Norwegian stock market. We propose 
the following hypothesis:  
 
2. Stock prices deviate at the close, and the price deviation reverses overnight.  
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1.2 Literature review  
The increase in trading volume at the close has lately started to gain attention and has been 
documented in the literature. Wu (2019) extended this field of research by investigating 
whether it was passive flows that led to the increased usage of market-on-close orders in the 
U.S. Considering that daily flows from index mutual funds were not available from major data 
vendors, Wu (2019) utilized daily ETF flows and retrieved market-on-close data from the 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. The final sample contained 6,663,021 stock-day 
observations over the period from July 2008 to June 2018. By estimating a panel regression 
of daily market-on-close volume on ETF flows, he found that the OLS results suggested an 
increase in market-on-close trading volume was strongly correlated with passive fund flows. 
The analysis focused on ETF flows, but the documented results could be generalized to index 
mutual funds (Wu, 2019). Next, by conducting analyses using a quasi-natural experiment 
based on the reconstruction of the Russell indices, the results provided support for the causal 
interpretation of the positive relationship between market-on-close trading volume and ETF 
flows. Wu and Jegadeesh (2020) further investigated if closing auction volume were related 
to ETF growth. Similarly, they found that trade volume in closing auctions grew 
simultaneously with assets invested through ETFs.  
Furthermore, Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) studied common stocks listed on the 
NYSE and Nasdaq, with prices greater than $5 and market capitalization greater than $100 
million. Volume and auction price were obtained from the TAQ database from January 2010 
to December 2018. The final sample consisted of 5,720,876 stock-day observations allocated 
across 1,887 NYSE-listed stocks (47.59% of all observations) and 2,946 Nasdaq-listed stocks 
(52.41% of all observations). By performing a difference-in-difference regression, 
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) supported previously mentioned results and showed that 
ETF and passive mutual fund ownership were strongly associated with the increase in closing 
auction volume. Additionally, the study confirmed that primarily institutional rebalancing and 
indexing contributed to increased trading during closing auctions because volume during 
closing auctions spiked on end-of-month and index rebalancing days. They found that while 
intraday turnover remained unchanged, closing auction and pre-close (15:55-16:00) turnovers 
were 87% and 33% higher during the last day of the month. On index rebalancing days, 
intraday turnover was only 7.8% higher, whereas closing auction and pre-close turnovers were 
230% and 78% higher.  
 12
In addition to demonstrating that aggregate passive flows were increasing the volume of 
market-on-close orders, Wu (2019) showed this possessed an impact on stock price dynamics. 
The findings provided direct evidence that stocks with high market-on-close trading volume 
experienced significantly larger price movements during the end of the trading day and that 
the price impact distorted closing prices. Wu (2019) also investigated whether the price impact 
was temporary. By using Fama-MacBeth regressions, he analyzed the cross-sectional relation 
between market-on-close trading volume and return reversals. Cross-sectional results revealed 
that on the following day, stocks with high market-on-close trading volume experienced 
significant reversals. Moreover, these results were shown to be robust across different 
exchanges. Using panel regressions, Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) also studied the 
determinants of closing price deviations. A model that studied how log overnight return 
depended on log auction deviation found that price deviations were primarily due to price 
pressure and not new information (Bogousslavsky & Muravyev, 2020). The result implied that 
overall, primary participants of the closing auction were mostly passive funds and other 
uninformed traders. They found that larger price deviations derived from higher closing 
auction turnover, and the same strong reversal pattern was also discovered. Results showed 
that the deviations reverted by half right after the closing auction. Closing price deviation was 
completely reversed overnight for large stocks and mostly reversed for small stocks, consistent 
with price pressure being mainly uninformed. Similarly, Wu and Jegadeesh (2020) studied the 
permanent and transitory components of the price impact by using an instrumental variables 
regression. They found that about 24% of the price impact reversed at the market opening the 
following day. The reversals continued over the next three to five days, resulting in a 
cumulative reversal of 83%. 17% of the reversals remained permanent, which was interpreted 
as that market-on-close orders additionally attracted significant participation of informed 
traders as well, consistent with theoretical implications of clustering of uninformed traders and 
informed traders.  
Theory predicts that liquidity may deteriorate at the open and dry up during the trading day as 
volume migrates towards the close (Foster & Viswanathan, 1990), something that becomes a 
possible externality due to the rise of index investing. To test whether intraday liquidity 
deteriorated as volume migrated to the close, Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) focused 
on another crucial intraday period – the open. They estimated a panel regression and found 
that liquidity indeed deteriorated at the open over the sample period. The results additionally 
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showed that in the first 15 minutes of trading, turnover declined by approximately 21% over 
the sample period for S&P 500 stocks. 
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) concluded that the continuing shift towards index 
investing might lead to further increased growth of trading during the closing auction, and Wu 
(2019) concluded that his findings impose important implications for investor welfare. He 
proposed that if the increase of market-on-close orders induces closing prices to distort and 
stock prices to deviate from the fundamental values, some index funds may benefit from 
accepting larger tracking errors by trading at other times than during the closing auction. 
 14
2. Data 
In this section, we present our data used to examine our hypotheses, data processing and 
assumptions we make. We start by describing our collection of intraday stock data, issued 
shares, and the price history of major U.S. indices. Further, we explain the data processing and 
possible weaknesses in the data. 
 
2.1 Data collection 
Intraday stock data was collected from the Oslo Stock Exchange and consists of every trade 
made on the Oslo Stock Exchange for 174 listed companies over a span of 15 months, from 
26.08.2019 to 04.12.2020. The stock data contains timestamps, trade volume, and price. All 
companies in the OBX and OSEBX Index are included. As shown in Table 8 in Appendix 
A.1, 31.61% of the stocks in our sample do not have a complete dataset for the whole time 
period due to a change in ticker or delisting (e.g., mergers). These companies were still 
included in our analysis as they did not exhibit any apparent unusual behavior and the changes 
did not affect our analysis. A complete list of all included companies is shown in Table 9 in 
Appendix A.2. The dataset contains a total of 46,085,457 unique observations.  
  
To compute stock turnover, we needed information about the number of shares available for 
each company during our sample period. We used NHH’s Børsprosjektet and sorted for 
TradeDate and include Symbol and Shares Issued. Before we could merge this data with our 
intraday stock data, we needed to manually adjust for companies that had changed tickers or 
were delisted during the sample period. Børsprosjektet would only present the new ticker for 
the whole period, so we used news reports from the Oslo Stock Exchange to find the number 
of shares issued for these companies and manually include it in our dataset.  
  
As the OBX and OSEBX Index constituents are reevaluated twice a year, we added an 
indicator for the constituents at all times during our sample period. We used the Oslo Stock 
Exchange NewsWeb site to find historical composition reports and created indicators for 
stocks in the OBX and OSEBX Index continuously throughout our sample period.   
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To remedy the fact that the Norwegian stock market to a certain degree is affected by the U.S. 
stock market, we collected price data of three major U.S. indices; Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, Nasdaq Composite, and Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500) from Yahoo Finance 
(Yahoo Finance, 2021). The U.S. stock market opens at 15:30 CET (except for four weeks a 
year which it opens at 14:30 CET due to difference in change to/from summertime). This 
allows Norwegian investors to react to the opening rise or fall of the U.S. market before the 
close of the Oslo Stock Exchange. We computed the overnight return and daily return of the 
three indices to be included in our analysis.  
 
We chose to include the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) as a measure of aggregate 
risk as it indicates the aggregate risk in the European equity market. The index measures 
implied volatility of near-term EuroStoxx 50 options that are traded on the Eurex exchange. 
VSTOXX can be considered the European equivalent of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange's CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). We retrieved historical price data from 
Investing.com (Investing.com, 2021) corresponding with our sample period and manually 
created time series. 
 
2.2 Data processing 
We defined the closing auction as all trades made after 16:20 each trading day. Although the 
closing auction is highly used for trading, some stocks had zero auction trades on occasional 
days in our sample. These observations would lead to a log turnover of negative infinity and 
computational problems. Out of the total of 52,491 stock trading days (nr. of stocks multiplied 
with nr. of trading days for each stock), 13,345 had zero trades during the closing auction. We 
encountered this problem in several intervals. As this constituted a large part of our dataset, 
we adjusted by adding 1 trade for all stocks in all intervals. By doing so, we prevented 
exclusion of a substantial part of our dataset, and the increase of 1 trade had a negligible impact 
on the final empirical results. To ensure that these observations were not driving the results, 
we ran a test where we excluded the observations and computed our simulations. We found 
that the results are equivalent to one another, as shown in Table 10 in Appendix A.3. 
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In addition to the closing auction, we aggregated the data into the following intervals: 1) 
Ordinary intraday trading (10:00-16:00), 2) Opening (09:00-09:59) 3) “Last” 15 minutes 
(16:00-16:15) and 4) Last 5 minutes (16:15-16:20). The opening was defined as the first hour 
of trading due to many stocks had no trades in the opening auction. Defining the opening as 
only the auction led to 17,860 stock-day observations without any opening trades, which in 
turn could lead to distributional misspecifications that could cause inconsistent estimates of 
parameters (Hautsch, Malec & Schienle, 2013).   
   
Interval volume for each ticker is the sum of all shares traded in the interval. We divided the 
interval volume by shares issued for each ticker to find the interval turnover. As illustrated in 
Figure 2, the distribution of auction turnover consists of some extreme values.  We suspected 
that some observations may be considered as outliers and damage our parameter estimates. 
We confirmed our suspicions with a Rosner’s test (Rosner, 1983) for outliers and excluded 
these observations from our analysis to avoid extreme observations (e.g., 08.04.2020, where 
the Oslo Stock Exchange closed at 13:00 due to Easter holidays). When we calculated and 
plotted the fraction of aggregate daily NOK volume made at different intervals during the day 
in Figure 3 in Section 4.1, we included all observations for illustrative purposes. We plot the 
same without outliers in Figure 5 in Appendix A.4.   
  
For each interval, the last trading price before the start of the interval and the last trading price 
in the interval was collected. If there were any cases where a stock did not have any trades 
during the time interval, we used the last trading price before the interval. 3,610 stock-days 
did not have any trades before 10:00. In these cases, we used the last price from the day before. 
We used the prices to calculate the return for each interval and the daily return.  
 






        (1) 
where volumei,j,t is the number of stocks traded of stock i in interval j at the date t and shares 
issuedi,t is the number of shares issued of stock i at date t.  
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2. Absolute price deviation at the close (%) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!,$ = | ln 6
1%&',!,$
1():+,,!,$
7 |      (2) 
where 𝑝-(2,!,$ is the price in the closing auction for stock i on the date t and 𝑝34:67,!,$ is the 
price in the last ordinary trade for stock i on the date t.  
3. Return:  
a. Daily 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛0-!'8,! = ln 6
1-%.$,!,$
1-%.$,!,$/(
7	       (3) 
where 𝑝'-+$,!,$ is the last trade price for stock i on the date t and 𝑝'-+$,!,$93 is the last trade price 
for stock i the day before (t-1).  
b. Intervals 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!,#,$ = ln 6
19'-+$!,#,$
19'-+$!,#/(,$
7        (4) 
where 𝑝 − 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡!,#,$ is the last traded price for stock i in interval j on the date t and    
𝑝 − 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡!,#93,$ is the last traded price for stock i in interval j-1 on the date t.  
c. Overnight 
	
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛&%*.:!;,$,!,$ = ln 6
1!,(,:,,,$
1-%.$,!,$/(
7       (5) 
where 𝑝!,37:77,$ is the price for stock i at 10:00 on date t and 𝑝'-+$,!,$93 is the last trade price for 






Figure 2: The figure to the left shows the frequency of auction turnover, while the figure to the right 
shows the frequency of price deviation.  
 
Descriptive statistics are illustrated in Table 1 below. The group of stocks with the most 
cumulative trades are the OSEBX, with 216.87 million stocks trades each day, while the 
remaining stocks have the fewest with 49.86 million stocks trades each day. Stocks in OSEBX 
and OBX are naturally significantly larger, more traded and use the closing auction more 
widely than the remaining stocks. Nevertheless, price deviation is more substantial for the 









Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
2.3 Bias in data 
We acknowledge that there may be some limitations to our data that may impact the results of 
our analysis. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, our sample period may not necessarily represent 
the real dynamics of the Oslo Stock Exchange. A massive market-drop in March 2020 showed 
an increase in stock turnover. As illustrated in Figure 3 in Section 4.1, some days in that period 
may be considered as outliers and have been removed to reduce the effect of this unusual 
activity on our parameter estimates. The market responded later in 2020 with a massive rise, 
which may also be considered unusual activity compared to long-term market behavior. As 
we do not possess data for other more “normal” years, we are not able to compare our results 
and check their validity in the longer term.  
  
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Daily trades 142 239.1 50 615.4 123 361.2 46 912.16 88 004.31 37 749.79 18 877.90 5 028.47
Stocks traded daily (mill.) 266.73 202.21 216.87 201.82 88.23 70.98 49.86 48.92
Average price (NOK) 116.95 130.89 122.39 123.14 145.72 133.39 81.36 168.93
Market cap. (Bill. NOK) 13 317.15 38 805.21 31 013.47 58 352.92 69 689.27 81 864.29 2 382.62 4 394.99
Auction fraction (%) 23.45 6.60 24.99 6.80 28.31 7.11 8.10 6.09
Turnover intraday 10:00-16:00 (bps) 34.04 110.15 35.71 110.00 30.49 89.04 32.33 110.28
Turnover open 09:00-09:59 (bps) 13.32 5.88 14.51 8.88 11.88 9.29 12.21 6.95
Turnover 16:00-16:15 (bps) 2.19 0.88 2.37 1.04 2.14 1.35 2.02 1.32
Turnover 16:15-16:20 (bps) 1.02 0.43 1.06 0.61 0.90 1.12 1.00 0.60
Turnover closing auction (bps) 3.37 1.89 4.72 2.03 7.17 3.17 2.01 3.08
Return daily (bps) 2.98 651.51 0.39 521.51 -4.08 522.71 5.65 762.39
Return intraday (bps) -16.48 352.38 -7.36 273.07 1.10 201.73 -26.17 420.35
Return 16:00-16:15 (bps) 1.06 94.86 2.00 70.72 1.19 53.82 0.09 114.49
Return 16:15-16:20 (bps) -1.36 82.54 0.43 54.97 1.05 28.68 -3.21 103.47
Return overnight (bps) 4.68 581.90 3.39 393.76 -1.59 382.61 6.05 730.50
Price deviation (bps) 64.09 130.55 41.18 98.69 24.97 57.36 84.11 148.07
Number of trades 39 969 021 28 513 398 6 116 436




In this section, we present the empirical methods used to examine our hypotheses. First, we 
describe the reasoning behind the choice of fixed versus random effects estimators on panel 
regressions. Second, we describe assumptions and associated measures we make to ensure the 
models' validity.  
3.1 Panel data, fixed effects, and random effects estimators 
A set of panel data consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the data set. 
The prominent feature of panel data that distinguishes them from a pooled cross-section is that 
the same cross-sectional units, in our case stocks, are observed throughout a given period 
(Wooldridge, 2016). With panel data, problems concerned with unobserved heterogeneity can 
be solved. Unobserved heterogeneity leads a pooled OLS estimator to be biased and 
inconsistent. Hence, we need a new kind of estimator.  
 
Two main types of methods for estimating unobserved effects panel data models are the fixed 
effects estimator and random effects estimator. The original unobserved effects model may be 
 
𝑦!$ = 𝛽7 + 𝛽3𝑥!$3 +⋯+ 𝛽<𝑥!$< + 𝛼! + 𝑢!$														𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇.      (6) 
 
The unobserved heterogeneity effect in model (6) is the term 𝛼!, while 𝑢!$ is the idiosyncratic 
error. Usually, we would allow to include time dummies among the independent variables as 
well. For fixed effects, the goal is to eliminate ai because it is thought to be correlated with 
one or several of the 𝑥!$. 
 
Model (6) becomes a random effects model when assuming that the unobserved effect 𝛼! is 






𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼! , 𝑥!$) = 0                 (7)  
If the covariance is equal to zero, it is the case that both random effects and fixed effects are 
consistent estimators. It is then also the case that the random effects estimation is more 
efficient than fixed effects. The standard error of random effects should be less than the 
standard error which fixed effects would have obtained. If the above assumption is not true, it 
is not the case that fixed and random effects are consistent. Thus, only fixed effects estimation 
is solely consistent, while random effects is no longer consistent. Fixed effects allow arbitrary 
correlation between the unobserved effect and independent variables, while random effects do 
not. Fixed effects are widely thought to be a more convincing tool for estimating ceteris 
paribus effects (Wooldridge, 2016).  
  
In order to test whether we should use fixed effects or random effects estimation, we 
performed a Hausman test. The test explicitly tests whether there is a correlation between the 
unobserved heterogeneity term and the independent variables. We essentially verify whether 
the null hypothesis, which is the above-stated assumption, is true by conducting the Hausman 
test. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, we conclude that random effects and fixed effects 
are consistent. Hence, we should use random effects estimation because of the fact that its 
variance is lower than that of fixed effects. Whereas if we reject the null hypothesis, we will 
conclude that fixed effects are the estimation strategy to go with because only fixed effects are 
consistent in the circumstance. The Hausman test result showed that we reject the null 
hypothesis on a 1% significant level. Hence, we believe the unobserved effect is correlated 
with at least one of the independent variables, and therefore we use fixed effects instead of 







3.2 One sided Welch two-sample t-test  
We used the one-sided Welch two-sample t-test to test whether the turnover of stocks in the 
OBX and OSEBX Index is significantly higher during the closing auction relative to the 
remaining stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Welch's t-test is an adaptation of the Student's 
t-test for comparing the means of two different groups, where we do not assume that the 
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where 𝑋@T  and 𝑠>?! are the 𝑖
$, sample mean and its standard error. The formula includes the 
variance of the two groups being compared, unlike the classic Student's t-test. 






3      (9) 
where, 𝑣! = 𝑁! − 1 is the degrees of freedom associated with the 𝑖$, variance estimate.  
 
3.3 Validity of the models  
In order to ensure our models have valid and robust inferences and the fixed effects estimator 
is consistent and unbiased, the OLS estimators need to be BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator). Therefore, a set of underlying assumptions must be satisfied. Consequently, which 
adjustments and measures have been made and considered for valid inferences to be possible 




According to the central limit theorem, the use of our models presupposes that we face 
independent and identically distributed random returns in our calculations (Liu, Rekkas & 
Wong, 2012). Whether returns in the stock market are normally distributed has been a much-
discussed topic. Hebner (2014) is among those who have researched this further and concluded 
that although investors can expect both positive and negative extreme values for returns in the 
stock market, it is reasonable to assume that these are randomly and normally distributed 
around an average. Nevertheless, to improve the readability of our results and to make them 
more easily comparable in the cross-section of stocks (OSEBX, OBX, and remaining stocks), 
we chose to log transform our models by taking the log of our dependent and independent 
variables. This helped with the normality of our observations, as the log of a variable typically 
has a distribution closer to normal than the variable itself (Wooldridge, 2016).  
 
3.3.2 Strict exogeneity 
The fixed effects estimator is inconsistent and unbiased without the strict exogeneity 
assumption. The error term must be unrelated to any explanatory variable at any given time, 
meaning that the conditional expected value of the residual must be zero. If the strict 
exogeneity assumption does not hold, endogeneity issues may arise and impact the analysis. 
Endogeneity issues are often caused by unobservable or observable stock characteristics and 
possible reverse-causality. In order to eliminate potential sources of endogeneity in our 
dataset, we have used a fixed effects model which eliminates time-invariant stock-specific 
characteristics by a within-group transformation.  
 
3.3.3 Homoscedasticity 
Homoskedasticity refers to when the error term in a regression model has constant variance 
conditional on the explanatory variables. While if the variance of the error term, given the 
explanatory variables, is not constant refers to heteroskedasticity. Without homoskedasticity, 
the inference is not valid; thus, the model cannot be considered efficient. We used a fixed 
 24
effects model to eliminate time-invariant stock-specific characteristics in addition to robust 
standard errors to account for issues related to heteroskedasticity.  
 
3.3.4 Autocorrelation 
For short intervals (less than 20 minutes), stock returns have a significant degree of 
autocorrelation, which refers to the correlation between the errors in different time periods in 
a panel data model. We used a Breusch-Godfrey test and found that at the 1% level, return for 
every stock has significant autocorrelation. We accounted for autocorrelation by including one 
lag of the stock return when calculating the auction price deviation. 
 
3.3.5 Normally distributed residuals 
The residuals must be normally distributed in order to make valid inferences from the 
regression. However, the central limit theorem states that the inference is valid when the 
number of observations is large and a minimum of 30 observations. Our dataset is sufficiently 
large, where the lowest amount throughout the regressions is 7,226 stock-day observations. In 
this way, we ensured that the residuals are normally distributed. 
 
3.3.6 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is a term that refers to correlation among two or several independent 
variables in the regression model. Usually, it is invoked when correlations appear to be “large”, 
but an actual magnitude is not defined (Wooldridge, 2016). Consequently, problems in the 
analysis may occur in the form of increased standard errors on the regression coefficients. The 
coefficients may not appear statistically different from zero, even though they, in reality, are 
so. In the presence of multicollinearity, the regression may not be able to isolate highly 
correlated independent variables from each other, leading the model to be unstable. We 
ensured no multicollinearity by omitting variables where the correlation of the model’s 
independent variables is high.  
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3.3.7 Stationarity  
Stationarity refers to time series having a constant variance and fluctuation around a constant 
mean over time. However, we disregarded non-stationarity issues in our dataset as we have 
large N (number of panel members) and T (time periods), consisting of N=174 stocks and 
T=324 days. In addition, we used an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on our variables to test for 
stationarity (Wooldridge, 2016). We discarded the null hypothesis at the 1% level, which 




In this section, we start by reporting the results from the analysis of auction turnover. Next, 
we report the results regarding price deviation. Lastly, a review of the results of reversals will 
be presented.  
4.1 Auction turnover 
Figure 3 illustrates the fraction of daily trades, expressed in NOK volume, intraday, and around 
the close. The top plot displays the fraction of daily trades made in ordinary intraday trading 
(10:00-16:15). The plot shows that the volume has been steady around 70%-80% of daily 
trades, but with some days of spikes and drops. The top right plot shows that the daily fraction 
of trades made in the last 5 minutes of ordinary trading (16:15-16:20) has been low and steady 
at below 5%, except for three days with extreme trading. The most extreme values were on 
the 17th of February 2020, when Akka Technologies acquired Data Respons AS, and on the 
2nd of December 2020 when Entra ASA announced the decision to reevaluate their assets with 
the expectation of a significant rise in their net asset value. The bottom left plot in Figure 3 
displays that the fraction of daily volume executed in the closing auction had a baseline of 
around 20% but was more volatile with more dominant spikes and fluctuations and, on some 
days, exceeded 60% of all trades. We see similar behavior for the opening in the last plot in 
Figure 4, with a baseline of around 15%-20%. 
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Figure 3: From the top left corner, the first figure illustrates the fraction of aggregate daily NOK 
volume made between 10:00 and 16:15. The second figure shows the fraction of aggregate daily NOK 
volume made in the last 5 min of ordinary trading (16:15-16:20). The bottom left figure displays the 
fraction of aggregate daily NOK volume made in the closing auction and the last figure illustrates the 
fraction of aggregate daily NOK volume made in the first hour of trading (09:00-09:59).  
 
Table 8 in the Appendix A.1 confirms the results illustrated in Figure 3 and gives descriptive 
statistics for our sample. Auction volume was 23.46% of daily NOK volume for an average 
stock-day for all stocks. The auction volume was similar for stocks in the OSEBX and OBX 
Index with 24.99% and 28.31%, respectively. In contrast, the auction was not used to such an 
extent for stocks not included in the OSEBX or OBX Index, as only 8.10% of daily trade 
volume was executed in the closing auction, and a more considerable fraction of trading 
occurred in ordinary trading hours. This pattern is also shown in the share of stocks with no 
trades in the closing auction. Only 2.57% and 0.33% of stocks-days in the OSEBX and OBX 
Index had no trades in the closing auction, while 40.98% of stock-days for the remaining 
stocks. Nevertheless, the closing auction had a significantly higher trading volume than the 
last 5 minutes of ordinary trading (16:15-16:20), where only 1.86% of the daily trade was 
executed on an average stock-day for all stocks. The last 5 minutes trade volume changed little 




We estimated a panel regression on log turnover for all companies to find the determinants of 
the turnover throughout the trading day. The regression results are illustrated in Table 2 on the 
following page. Each column represents a stock-fixed effects model with the same variables 
as included in Section 2.2. We included dummies for specific calendar days to adjust for 
seasonalities and special trading days (e.g., the third Friday of each month is typically a stock 
option expiration day). To compare our estimation for auction turnover, we included 
equivalent regressions with pre-close/last 5 min turnover (16:15-16:20) and intraday turnover 
(10:00-16:15) as dependent variables. Furthermore, we included the log turnover in different 
intervals throughout the trading day (09:00-09:59, 16:00-16:15, and 16:15-16:20) to control 
for intraday changes that may not be specific to the closing auction. We controlled for 
volatility by including the average absolute return over the past three trading days, including 
the current day. Furthermore, we included the lagged return, return from 16:00-16:15, in 
addition to overnight and lagged return of major U.S. indices.  
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Table 2: Panel regression with stock fixed effects for all stocks. The log auction turnover, log turnover 
in the last 5 min of ordinary trading and log intraday turnover (10:00-16:15) are regressed on 
explanatory variables.  
 
Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. The independent variables include:  
- Indicators for the 3rd Friday and first and last day of month, 
- log turnover for the intervals 09:00-09:59, 16:00-16:15 and 16:15-16:20, 
- The absolute return averaged over the last three trading days, log Avg|Ret|, 
- The return from 16:00-16:15, the lagged return (Return(t-1)) and the return made from the end of the previous until current 
trading day at 10:00 (Return overnight), 
- Overnight returns and lagged daily return for the indices Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq and S&P 500.  
 
Auction turnover Last 5min Turnover Intraday turnover
Last of month 0.406*** 0.081 -0.034
(0.053) (0.057) (0.029)
3rd Friday 0.220*** -0.019 0.041
(0.054) (0.058) (0.029)
First of month -0.178*** -0.146*** -0.025
(0.052) (0.056) (0.028)
log Turnover 09:00-09:59 0.228*** 0.294***
(0.008) (0.009)
log Turnover 16:00-16:15 0.165*** 0.261***
(0.004) (0.005)
log Turnover 16:15-16:20 0.188***
(0.004)
log Avg|Ret| 0.279*** 0.350*** 0.617***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.008)
Return 16:00-16:15 -1.544 -3.661*** 3.127***
(1.120) (1.203) (0.601)
Return(t-1) -0.638*** 0.182 0.285***
(0.166) (0.178) (0.089)
Return overnight 1.660** 2.233*** 0.333
(0.706) (0.759) (0.379)
Dow Jones return overnight 4.907*** 1.372 5.460***
(1.724) (1.852) (0.926)
Nasdaq return overnight 5.203** 1.148 -11.481***
(2.598) (2.792) (1.395)
S&P500 return overnight -11.857*** -3.055 10.827***
(3.486) (3.746) (1.872)
Dow Jones return(t-1) -1.317 -1.263 -1.603**
(1.327) (1.426) (0.713)
Nasdaq return(t-1) 2.599* 0.690 3.282***
(1.360) (1.461) (0.730)
Observations 43,497 43,497 43,497
R2 0.175 0.157 0.127
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.153 0.123
F Statistic 613.801*** (df = 15; 43308) 574.464*** (df = 14; 43309) 523.831*** (df = 12; 43311)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 30
As expected, the auction volume was higher on days with higher trade volume earlier in the 
day. We also noticed that the auction turnover was significantly larger on the last day and the 
third Friday of each month. At the same time, it was not the case for the last 5 minutes and 
intraday turnover. Additionally, we observed that the U.S. market affected the trade volume 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange to a great extent. The start of regular trading for the U.S. stock 
market is 15:30 CET, which means that Norwegian investors can monitor the opening trend 
(expressed as overnight return) of major U.S. indices and have time to adjust their portfolio 
by the end of the Oslo Stock Exchange trading day. As we can see from the panel regression 
in Table 2 an increase in overnight return for Dow Jones and Nasdaq is associated with a 
significant increase in auction turnover. We see the opposite for the S&P 500 Index. This is 
also the case for the intraday turnover, in addition to also being affected by the lagged return 
of these indices. In contrast, the effect is not significant for the turnover in the last 5 minutes 
of ordinary trading, meaning that U.S. indices returns do not, on average, significantly affect 
the pre-close turnover for the stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
We allocated stocks into three groups defined by their inclusion/exclusion in the OSEBX or 
OBX Index to observe any differences between them. The results of the stock-fixed effects 
models are presented in Table 3 on the next page. We regressed log auction turnover on the 
same variable as in Table 2 and saw that same-day turnover had a similar positive association 
with auction turnover for all three groups. Day-specific indicators showed the same pattern, 
where the auction turnover was higher on the last day of the month and the third Friday of 
each month. OSEBX rebalancing days significantly impacted auction turnover for stocks 
included in the OBX Index but not for other stocks. OBX rebalancing days seemed to have no 
significant impact on any of the groups. Stocks in OSEBX and OBX are influenced by the 
major U.S. indices, unlike stocks that are not included (remaining stocks). Interestingly, the 
overnight return of the S&P 500 Index seemed to have a negative impact on the auction 




Table 3: Panel regressions with stock fixed effects for stocks in OSEBX, OBX and the remaining 
stocks. The log auction turnover regressed on explanatory variables.  
 
Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. The independent variables include:  
- Indicators for the 3rd Friday and first and last day of month, 
- log turnover for the intervals 09:00-09:59, 16:00-16:15 and 16:15-16:20, 
- The absolute return averaged over the last three trading days, log Avg|Ret|, 
- The return from 16:00-16:15, 16:15-16:20 and the lagged return (Return(t-1)), 
- OSEBX and OBX rebalancing are indicators for OSEBX and OBX rebalancing dates, 
- Overnight returns and lagged daily return for the indices Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq and S&P 500.  
Auction turnover
OSEBX OBX Remaining stocks
Last of month 0.475*** 0.289*** 0.349***
(0.046) (0.027) (0.086)
3rd Friday 0.294*** 0.282*** 0.161*
(0.047) (0.027) (0.087)
First of month -0.095* -0.066** -0.226**
(0.049) (0.028) (0.091)
log Turnover 09:00-09:59 0.136*** 0.075*** 0.254***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
log Turnover 16:00-16:15 0.186*** 0.280*** 0.162***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
log Turnover 16:15-16:20 0.176*** 0.168*** 0.188***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
log Avg|Ret| 0.159*** 0.064*** 0.375***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.025)
Return 16:00-16:15 0.251 1.302 -3.335**
(1.368) (1.066) (1.567)
Return 16:15-16:20 -2.938* -0.817 -8.425***
(1.742) (1.988) (1.902)
OSEBX rebalancing 0.140 0.192** -0.315
(0.128) (0.075) (0.234)
OBX rebalancing -0.111 -0.090 -0.176
(0.119) (0.070) (0.218)
Return(t-1) -0.406** -0.245** -0.724***
(0.192) (0.111) (0.235)
Dow Jones return overnight 7.027*** 2.584*** 4.523
(1.549) (0.912) (2.786)
Nasdaq return overnight 5.164** 1.480 3.843
(2.313) (1.361) (4.157)
S&P500 return overnight -13.354*** -7.168*** -10.762*
(3.137) (1.844) (5.563)
Dow Jones return(t-1) -7.480*** -2.580*** 3.937
(1.532) (0.904) (2.750)
Nasdaq return(t-1) 4.225** 5.237*** 3.830
(1.643) (0.972) (2.965)
S&P500 return(t-1) 2.173 -3.069** -5.287
(2.206) (1.304) (3.968)
Observations 18,581 6,972 24,916
R2 0.200 0.400 0.175
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.396 0.171
F Statistic 257.587*** (df = 18; 18498) 256.401*** (df = 18; 6931) 292.175*** (df = 18; 24789)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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We compared the closing auction turnover for stocks in OSEBX and OBX with the remaining 
stocks by performing a one-sided Welch two-sample t-test and display the test results in 
Appendix A.5 Figure 6. Our results showed that the auction turnover was significantly higher 
for stocks in OSEBX and OBX than the remaining stocks on a 1% level with t-values of 29.40 
and 37.38, respectively.  
4.2 Price deviation 
Table 11 in Appendix A.6 reports the descriptive statistics for the closing auction price 
deviation for our entire sample and divided into groups defined by inclusion/exclusion in the 
OSEBX or OBX Index. Auction price deviation was on average 64.09 bps for all stocks and 
varied from 24.97 bps for stocks in OBX to 84.11 bps for the stocks not included in OSEBX 
or OBX (remaining stocks). The distribution was positively skewed. In 10% and 5% of stock-
days, auction prices deviated by more than 155 bps (1.55%) and 240 bps (2.40%), respectively. 
Results showed that the spread was driven by the non-index stocks, wherein 10% and 5% of 
stock-days auction price deviated by more than 209 bps and 306 bps, respectively. The mean 
price deviation of 64.09 bps accounted for a change in the total daily trade volume of NOK 
46.88 million and a NOK 85 million change in market capitalization for an average stock.  
 
Table 4 illustrates the results of the auction price deviation panel regression model. We 
focused on the cross-stock variation by including date fixed effects instead of stock fixed 
effects. As expected, a higher auction turnover corresponded to a higher absolute price 
deviation. In contrast, our results showed that absolute price deviation decreased with a higher 
turnover earlier in the day. This held for stocks in the OSEBX and non-index stocks. Our fixed 
effects model for stocks in the OBX Index gave significant independent variables, but due to 
the low adjusted R2, we are careful to draw conclusions from our model. Absolute price 
deviation was significantly smaller for stocks in OSEBX and OBX. The price deviation was 
smaller for stocks with high stock prices and larger when the volatility was higher. The 




Table 4: Panel regressions with date fixed effects for stocks in OSEBX, OBX and the remaining stocks. 
The auction price deviation is regressed on explanatory variables.  
 
Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. The independent variables include:  
- log turnover for the intervals 16:15-16:20, 09:00-16:15 and the auction, 
- The logarithm of each stock’s price, 
- The absolute return averaged over the last three trading days, log Avg|Ret|, 
- The lagged auction price deviation, Auction price deviation (t-1), 
- Indicators for the stocks included in OSEBX or OBX on a given day. 
 
We further analyzed the drivers behind the auction price deviation by plotting the VSTOXX 
against the value-weighted auction return in Figure 4 on the following page. The plot show 
that the time series are highly correlated, meaning that auction prices are more likely to deviate 
when the aggregate risk is high. Most notably, the plot shows a massive spike in risk and a 
corresponding spike in price deviation during March 2020, as Covid-19 started to spread and 
countries went into lockdown. Table 5 confirms that aggregate risk, expressed as VSTOXX, 
drives aggregate price deviation in our sample. The results showed that the VSTOXX can 
account for more than 34% of the variation in value-weighted auction return/deviation. Thus, 




All OSEBX OBX Remaining stocks
log Turnover 16:15-16:20 -2.711*** -2.170*** -1.858* -2.300***
(0.263) (0.471) (1.093) (0.356)
log Turnover 09:00-16:15 -7.956*** -4.092*** 4.556*** -7.686***
(0.568) (0.873) (1.373) (0.880)
log Turnover Auction 1.728*** 1.177** 6.935*** 1.683***
(0.371) (0.590) (1.257) (0.518)
log Price -12.741*** -9.273*** -3.676*** -13.875***
(0.484) (0.641) (0.696) (0.727)
log Avg|Ret| 19.705*** 13.323*** 3.549*** 22.398***
(0.944) (1.173) (1.291) (1.477)
Auction price deviation (t-1) 0.112*** 0.062*** -0.001 0.117***





Observations 36,493 18,199 6,970 16,753
R2 0.102 0.050 0.031 0.079
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.033 -0.014 0.062
F Statistic 511.548*** (df = 8; 36180) 134.113*** (df = 7; 17888) 35.149*** (df = 6; 6660) 235.360*** (df = 6; 16443)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Figure 4: VSTOXX price in EUR (black) and value-weighted auction return in basis points (blue). 
To compute the auction deviation, we value-weighted the price deviation at the close across stocks 
and took an absolute value. 
 
Table 5: Panel regressions with stock fixed effects for all stocks. The value-weighted auction return is 
regressed on the VSTOXX price (EUR).  
 
Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Value-weighted auction return







Residual Std. Error 9.185 (df = 312)
F Statistic 165.610*** (df = 1; 312)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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4.3 Reversals 
Table 6 shows the panel regression model outputs for the overnight return for all stocks in our 
sample with stock-fixed effects. We found that a significant amount (75%) of the return from 
end of ordinary trading to end of auction (16:20-auction) was reversed before 10:00 the next 
day. We got the similar results when we controlled for return in the last 5 minutes of ordinary 
trading (16:15-16:20). Over 40% of the return made in the last 5 minutes of ordinary trading 
was also reversed by 10:00 next morning, but due to the negative adjusted R2 we are careful 
to draw conclusions from this result. In Table 7 we present the results for the same regressions 
separated into our groups of interest. We observed that the auction returns almost fully reverted 
(a coefficient of -1 means that prices revert completely) for stocks in OSEBX and OBX. We 
found that over 95% of the price deviation in the closing auction was reversed the following 
morning for stocks in OSEBX and OBX. The reversals were smaller for the remaining stocks. 
Similarly, last 5 minutes return for stocks in the OSEBX reverted significantly by the next 
morning. However, as with our model for the full sample, our model for OSEBX and OBX 
was a poor fit for the observations.   
 
Table 6: Panel regressions with stock fixed effects for all stocks. The overnight return from pre-close 
(16:20) and closing auction is regressed on return form 16:20 – auction close and the return in the last 
5 minutes of ordinary trading (16:15-16:20). 
 




Overnight returns - Full Sample
Return auction-09:59 Return auction-09:59 Return 16:20-09:59
Return 16:20-auction -0.750*** -0.777***
(0.018) (0.018)
Return 16:15-16:20 -0.352*** -0.414***
(0.035) (0.035)
Observations 43,582 43,582 43,582
R2 0.039 0.041 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.038 -0.001
F Statistic 1,772.059*** (df = 1; 43407) 938.781*** (df = 2; 43406) 143.081*** (df = 1; 43407)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 7: Panel regressions with stock fixed effects for stocks in OSEBX, OBX and the remaining 
stocks. The overnight return from pre-close (16:20) and closing auction is regressed on return form 




Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Overnight returns - OSEBX
Return auction-09:59 Return auction-09:59 Return 16:20-09:59
Return 16:20-auction -0.952*** -0.959***
(0.013) (0.013)
Return 16:15-16:20 -0.292*** -0.305***
(0.046) (0.046)
Observations 18,591 18,591 18,591
R2 0.223 0.225 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.222 -0.001
F Statistic 5,318.697*** (df = 1; 18525) 2,685.432*** (df = 2; 18524) 44.787*** (df = 1; 18525)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Overnight returns - OBX
Return auction-09:59 Return auction-09:59 Return 16:20-09:59
Return 16:20-auction -0.987*** -0.986***
(0.012) (0.012)
Return 16:15-16:20 0.090 0.087
(0.113) (0.113)
Observations 6,972 6,972 6,972
R2 0.507 0.507 0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.506 -0.003
F Statistic 7,150.223*** (df = 1; 6948) 3,575.235*** (df = 2; 6947) 0.591 (df = 1; 6948)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Overnight returns - Remaining stocks
Return auction-09:59 Return auction-09:59 Return 16:20-09:59
Return 16:20-auction -0.384*** -0.431***
(0.036) (0.037)
Return 16:15-16:20 -0.287*** -0.441***
(0.048) (0.047)
Observations 24,991 24,991 24,991
R2 0.004 0.006 0.004
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.001 -0.001
F Statistic 111.417*** (df = 1; 24881) 73.688*** (df = 2; 24880) 87.428*** (df = 1; 24881)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 37 
5. Discussion 
In this section, we elaborate on our analyses and results. We follow the same order as the 
results section, first discussing the findings of the subject of auction turnover. Then, a 
discussion regarding price deviation will follow. Finally, the results regarding reversals will 
be discussed.  
5.1 Auction turnover 
Institutional investors are benchmarked with month-end prices. The investors aim to minimize 
tracking error by trading at the close due to their benchmarks often being set by closing prices, 
something that further encourages them to trade at the close. Our results are supported by 
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev's (2020) findings, as institutional rebalancing seems to affect 
turnover in the closing auction since the turnover is higher on the last day of the month, but 
the intraday turnover remains unchanged. Several institutional investors will meet the inflow 
of capital in the first days of the month (Etula, Rinne, Suominen & Vaittinen, 2020). Thus, 
auction turnover and pre-close turnover are significantly higher on the first day of each month. 
In addition, auction turnover spikes on the 3rd Friday of each month because these are 
typically option expiration days, and market makers will drop their stock delta-hedges after 
the options expire.  
 
We find that the auction turnover is higher on days with higher trade volume earlier in the day, 
consistent with Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), which is the case for all stock groups. 
Index funds rebalance their portfolio in the last minutes of ordinary trading and especially at 
the closing auction to minimize tracking error. In contrast to Bogousslavsky and Muravyev 
(2020), we find that OSEBX rebalancing days merely significantly impact stocks included in 
OBX, where the auction turnover increases by 19.2%. Our findings show no significant change 
in auction turnover on OBX rebalancing days, indicating that index investing has a weaker 
link to closing auction volume on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
We argue that three factors can partly explain the lack of rebalancing effect for Norwegian 
stocks. First, it may be from the fact that out of the 70 index funds presented by the Norwegian 
Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF) in 2019, only 12 have their main or sole focus 
on stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (VFF, 2021). Index funds tend to focus on a 
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global scale, with a large fraction of their portfolio in the American stock market, which can 
explain why the index rebalancing days have a more significant impact on the use of closing 
auctions in the U.S. than in Norway. Second, the Norwegian stock market is closely linked to 
the American stock market, and there are some obvious contagion effects. We find that auction 
turnover is significantly higher when the overnight return of Dow Jones and Nasdaq indices 
opens positively (positive overnight return) for stocks in OSEBX. The remaining stocks do 
not seem to be significantly affected. Consequently, if the American market opens 
surprisingly, Norwegian investors may use the pre-close and closing auction to adjust their 
portfolios. Lastly, Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) found that the stock's degree of ETF 
ownership affects investors' use of the closing auction and that ETF ownership is highly 
significant for auction turnover.  As of year-end 2020, there were 1,675 index-based ETFs in 
the United States with $5.4 trillion in net assets, accounting for 18% of U.S.-registered 
investment company total net assets (ICI, 2021). In contrast, ETFs in Norway play a lesser 
role. Only four ETFs that track the OBX Index are traded on Euronext as of May 2021 
(Euronext, 2021), with assets under management of NOK 3.12 billion, which only constitutes 
0.19% of the Norwegian fund market (VFF, 2021). The small portion of ETFs in the 
Norwegian market can be a reason for our results showing a weaker relationship between 
index investing and auction turnover.  
 
Overall, closing auction volume seems to differ relative to other periods during the day. 
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) argued that the closing auction has become a great 
trading mechanism that has increased significantly in importance and activity during recent 
years. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) anticipated that clustering of trades that are not based on 
firm-specific information at specific times during the day would reduce costs and increase 
price efficiency. Furthermore, if traders clustered their trades around times of higher liquidity, 
intraday liquidity may deteriorate (Foster & Viswanathan, 1990). Liquidity drying up during 
the rest of the intraday may be a concerning trend as the opening period is crucial for pricing 
in overnight news (Bogousslavsky & Muravyev, 2020). An effect where liquidity induces 
liquidity is predicted to cause informed traders to strategically pool with these uninformed 
traders to minimize the price impacts of their trades (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988), i.e., market 
participants are attracted to the price efficiency and the liquidity that the closing auction offers. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough historical data to test if this applies to the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. However, we find that the auction volume is significantly larger than the opening 
and the last 5 minutes of ordinary trading. In addition, auction turnover is significantly higher 
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for stocks in OSEBX and OBX, which are the largest stocks, than the remaining stocks on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange, consistent with research conducted by Bogousslavsky and Muravyev 
(2020).  
 
5.2 Price deviation 
Our results indicate that prices deviate significantly in the closing auction, which can be 
compared to Bogousslavsky and Muravyev's (2020) and Wu's (2019) findings with some 
reservations. Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) and Wu (2019) calculated price deviation 
from the 4 pm closing quote midpoint, while our analysis uses the final trade price before the 
close. Using the trade price instead of the bid-ask midpoint to compute price deviation might 
lead to biased results due to the illiquidity of smaller ETFs (Broman, 2016; Petajisto, 2017). 
However, due to the low number of ETFs on the Oslo Stock Exchange, we argue that this 
effect is negligible.  
 
We know from Table 1 that stocks in OBX are, on average, larger than stocks in OSEBX, 
while the remaining stocks are the smallest. As illustrated in Figure 7 in Appendix A.7 we find 
that the price deviations are significantly higher for the smallest stocks and decrease with size, 
meaning that price deviations are lowest for stocks in OBX. Thus, our results are supported 
by Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020). One explanation may be that the auction improves 
price discovery more for the less actively traded stocks (Madhaven, 1992). In addition, 
liquidity shocks may have less impact on large stocks with higher market-making capacity 
than smaller stocks (Bogousslavsky & Muravyev, 2020). 
  
When investigating the drivers behind the auction price deviation, we find that higher auction 
turnover significantly correlates with a higher price deviation. This finding is supported by 
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), who found that a 1% increase in turnover led to a 0.88 
bps higher price deviation. In contrast to Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), we find that 
the auction turnover has a more significant impact on stocks in OBX than smaller stocks. Wu 
(2019) demonstrated that passive flows increased the market-on-close orders, which impacted 
stock price dynamics. We argue that the larger impact on stocks in OBX is because passive 
funds hold the stocks in OBX and that the closing auction orders placed by passive fund 
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managers are so significant that one cannot guarantee immediate liquidity to be available (Wu, 
2019). Liquidity providers should be compensated for meeting the high demand for liquidity 
to passive funds at the end of the day (Nagel, 2012; Duffie, 2010).  
  
Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020) compared aggregate price deviation and the VIX and 
found that they are highly correlated. We compare the aggregate price deviation of our sample 
to the European VSTOXX and find similar results. Prices are more likely to deviate at the 
closing auction when the aggregate risk is high. As Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), we 
find that aggregate risk drives a large portion of the price deviation, meaning that price 
deviation is significant at the aggregate level and will also affect diversified portfolios.  
5.3 Reversals 
We use our model for price-reversal to investigate if the price deviation at the close is caused 
by information or price pressure. If the price deviation is based on information, the information 
hypothesis states that the prices are correct and should be permanent. On the other hand, the 
prices should reverse shortly if the price deviation is due to price pressure (Bogousslavsky & 
Muravyev, 2020). Our results show that over 75% of the price deviation at the close for all 
stocks reverse before 10:00 the following day. The results align with both Bogousslavsky and 
Muravyev (2020) and Wu and Jegadeesh (2020). The price reversal indicates that the price 
deviation is primarily due to price pressure and not new information. As 25% of the price 
deviation at the close does not reverse by the following day, there is a possibility that some of 
the price deviation is permanent. Wu and Jegadeesh (2020) found that 17% of the reversals 
remained permanent. We can interpret this lack of reversal as that market-on-close orders 
additionally attract significant participation of informed traders as well, consistent with 
theoretical implications of clustering of uninformed traders and informed traders (Admati & 
Pfleiderer, 1988).  
 
Further, we find that the reversal is almost 100% for stocks in the OSEBX and OBX. As the 
stocks in OSEBX and OBX are, on average, the largest stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
our results are consistent with Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), who found a complete 
reversal for the largest stocks. The reversal implies that overall, primary participants of the 
closing auction were mostly passive funds that hold the stocks in OSEBX and OBX, in 
addition to other uninformed traders. 
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6. Conclusion 
The field of index investing has recently started to gain increased attention in financial 
literature as closing auctions across exchanges are becoming an increasingly important trading 
period. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the closing auction on a relatively little featured 
market, the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
First, we analyze whether or not index investing drives closing auction turnover and if the 
turnover of stocks in the OSEBX and OBX Index is significantly higher during the closing 
auction than the remaining stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Second, we examine whether 
prices deviate at the close and reverse overnight.  Our hypotheses build on the findings of Wu 
(2019), Bogousslavsky and Muravyev (2020), and Wu and Jegadeesh (2020), who found that 
auction turnover is significantly higher on index rebalancing days and correlates to the degree 
of ETF ownership. To test our first hypothesis, we use a fixed effects regression model based 
on a sample of 174 stocks traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange over a sample period of 314 
days, consisting of a total of 46,085,457 trades. We continue by using a Welch two-sample t-
test to compare the stocks included in the OSEBX and OBX Index with the remaining stocks. 
Furthermore, we test our second hypothesis with fixed effects regression models to find the 
determinants of price deviation and examine if the prices reverse overnight. In addition, we 
model the value-weighted auction return with respect to aggregate risk, expressed as 
VSTOXX.   
 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, our analysis shows that the turnover of stocks in the 
OSEBX and OBX are significantly higher than the remaining stocks during the closing 
auction. Moreover, we find that OSEBX rebalancing days merely significantly impact stocks 
included in OBX, where the auction turnover increases by 19.2%. However, we find no 
significant change in auction turnover on OBX rebalancing days, indicating that index 
investing has a weaker link to auction volume on the Oslo Stock Exchange than discovered in 
the U.S. We argue that a weak link between index investing and the use of the closing auction 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange is primarily due to three factors: 1) Even though index investing 
has experienced a rise in popularity in recent years, a vast majority of the index funds track 
indices other than the OSEBX and OBX, 2) the Norwegian stock market is highly linked to 
the U.S. market and turnover at the close is affected by the opening return of major U.S. indices 
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and 3) ETFs plays a much larger part of the trading in the U.S. than in Norway, as ETFs' total 
net asset value only constitutes 0.19% of the Norwegian fund market (VFF, 2021). To 
conclude, our hypothesis that auction turnover is significantly higher for stocks in OSEBX 
and OBX than the remaining stocks is valid. However, the use of the closing auction on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange might be more influenced by opening trends of the American stock 
market than index investing. We suggest that more research is needed to conclude that index 
investing drives closing auction turnover.    
 
Our results show that prices deviate significantly in the closing auction and that a high positive 
correlation with auction turnover exists. Prices are more likely to deviate at the closing auction 
when the aggregate risk is high. Further, we find that more than 75% of the price deviation at 
the close for all stocks reverses before 10:00 the following day, and the reversal is almost 
100% for stocks in the OSEBX and OBX. Hence, our second hypothesis that prices deviate at 
the close and reverse overnight is verified. The price reversal indicates that the price deviation 
is primarily due to price pressure and not new information. Consistent with Wu (2019), our 
results may indicate that if the increase of auction trades induces closing prices to distort and 
stock prices to deviate from the fundamental values, some index funds may benefit from 
accepting larger tracking errors by trading at other times than during the closing auction. 
 
For further research, we believe it would be interesting to conduct similar analyses on a more 
extensive sample period to investigate whether investor behavior has changed over time. A 
larger data sample would allow for comparison of auction volume and price deviation with the 
influx of capital to index investment funds. The results may potentially change when including 
“normal” years that are not affected by a pandemic. From an investor’s point of view, it would 
also be interesting to evaluate the possibility of developing an investment strategy that takes 
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A.1 Trading volume statistics 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the trading volume.   
 
  
Mean Median StdDev Mean Median StdDev Mean Median StdDev Mean Median StdDev
Auction vol. share (%) 23.45 22.65 6.60 24.99 24.21 6.80 28.31 27.51 7.11 8.10 6.77 6.09
16:15-16:20 vol. share (%) 1.86 1.60 2.55 1.71 1.57 1.35 1.58 1.52 0.57 2.36 1.77 4.94
10:00-16:15 vol. share (%) 74.77 75.50 6.94 73.39 74.18 7.01 70.20 71.06 7.25 89.58 90.79 7.53
Price (NOK) 116.95 79.76 130.89 122.39 88.70 123.14 145.72 129.50 133.39 81.36 23.26 168.93
Daily trade vol. (m. shares) 266.73 213.98 202.21 216.87 161.77 201.82 88.23 65.55 70.98 49.86 36.45 48.92
No 09:00-16:15 vol. (%)
No 16:15-16:20 vol. (%)
No auction volume (%)
Non-complete dataset (%) 31.61













All stocks OSEBX OBX Remaining stocks
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A.2 Descriptive statistics for stocks in dataset 





1 Adevinta Ser. A ADEA 231.38 19 841 40 0 Share collapse of class A and B on 24.10.19. (1) 
2 Adevinta Ser. B ADEB 333.01 23 783 40 0 Share collapse of class A and B on 24.10.19. (1) 
3 AF Gruppen AFG 207.23 45 348 324 2
4 Arendals Fossekompani AFK 21.55 9 603 322 231
5 Akastor AKA 3 024.52 54 720 304 3
6 Aker AKER 85.02 566 092 324 1
7 Aker BP AKERBP 235.82 1 463 349 304 1
8 Aker Solutions AKSO 1 467.44 772 546 324 1
9 AKVA Group AKVA 618.57 10 467 324 144
10 American Shipping Co AMSC 664.48 38 984 324 25
11 AqualisBraemer LOC AQUA 3 553.01 8 537 318 259
12 Archer ARCHER 3 949.69 42 091 304 40
13 Arcus ARCUS 592.71 25 595 324 109
14 ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASC 4 713.40 42 133 304 51 Changed ticker to ABG on 30.11.20. (2)
15 Asetek ASETEK 404. 68 50 278 304 35
16 ATEA ATEA 302.78 130 584 324 1
17 Atlantic Petroleum ATLA 464.11 808 170 161
18 Austevoll Seafood AUSS 270.47 328 994 324 1
19 Avance Gas Holding AVANCE 840.16 394 190 304 1
20 Awilco Drilling PLC AWDR 1 093.55 16 227 324 153
21 Axactor AXA 2 481.98 201 896 324 1
22 B2Holding B2H 2 813.48 207 407 324 1
23 Bakkafrost BAKKA 84.91 693 012 324 1
24 Borr Drilling Limited BDRILL 980.62 474 010 304 1
25 Belships BEL 11 751.94 1 980 291 277
26 BerGenBio BGBIO 632.41 288 531 324 25
27 Biotec Pharmacon BIOTEC 1 478.58 30 576 185 78 Rebranded to ArticZymes Tech. (AZT) 17.06.2020. (3)
28 Byggma BMA 272.94 1 179 254 239
29 Bonheur BON 191.70 122 906 304 1
30 Borgestad BOR 1 736.62 5 213 320 279
31 Bouvet BOUVET 141.26 24 359 304 77
32 Borregaard BRG 283.13 140 788 324 1
33 BW LPG BWLPG 516.02 601 195 324 1
34 BW Offshore BWO 584.57 538 692 324 1
35 Carasent CARA 1 415.74 37 561 324 146
36 ContextVision COV 316.05 37 556 304 140
37 Crayon Group Holding CRAYON 450.70 160 226 304 1
38 Cxense CXENSE 4 140.08 238 28 18 Aquired by Piano on 03.10.19. (4)
39 Data Respons DAT 5 235.38 17 047 167 13 Aquired by AKKA Technologies 05.05.20. (5)
40 DNB DNB 461.82 1 825 874 324 1
41 DOF DOF 7 568.93 55 215 324 127
42 Eidesvik Offshore EIOF 3 205.66 7 409 309 270
43 Element ELE 2 402.06 73 618 324 69
44 Elkem ELK 1135.91 340 910 324 1
45 ElectroMagnetic GeoServices EMGS 4 918.90 25 535 324 172
46 ENDUR ENDUR 8 082.82 57 800 323 158
47 Entra ENTRA 462.10 445 287 324 1
48 Europris EPR 620.51 345 314 324 1
49 Equinor EQNR 464.24 3 000 149 324 1
50 Evry EVRY 730.28 15 389 55 1 Merged with Tieto (TIETOO) on 05.12.19. (6)
51 Fjord1 FJORD 3 750.75 16 399 322 70
52 Fjordkraft Holding FKRAFT 536.51 177 332 304 1
53 Flex LNG FLNG 366.33 228 276 324 1
54 Frontline FRO 420.59 982 609 324 1
55 Funcom FUNCOM 2 185.57 68 919 221 17 Aquired by Tencent on 22.07.20. (7)
56 Gaming Innovation Group GIG 1 634.27 49 935 324 65
57 Gjensidige Forsikring GJF 212.44 757 832 324 1
58 Goodtech GOD 1 881.61 22 752 317 243
59 Golden Ocean Group GOGL 591.30 499 880 324 1
60 Grieg Seafood GSF 264.86 450 225 324 1
61 Gyldendal GYL 19.82 665 173 159
62 Havila Shipping HAVI 1 483.84 11 185 322 243
63 Hexagon Composites HEX 569.07 297 659 324 1
64 Hiddn Solutions HIDDN 5 025.54 29 832 284 151 Changed name to Arribatec Solutions on 12.10.20. (8)
65 Hoegh LNG Holdings HLNG 762.06 51 236 324 29
66 Havyard Grup HYARD 1 737.84 38 116 316 225
67 Idex Biometrics IDEX 8 972.78 276 005 324 4
68 Incus Investor INC 5 876.38 3 194 163 141 Changed name to Scana 11.05.2020. (9)
69 Infront INFRNT 2 171.28 6 453 301 214
70 Insr Insurance Group INSR 7 919.04 51 276 322 165














71 InterOil Exploration and Production IOX 4 413.42 31 791 324 126
72 Itera ITE 1 233.22 8 999 301 211
73 JinHui Shipping and Transportation JIN 2 363.85 15 403 324 97
74 Kid KID 420.93 59 710 324 80
75 Kitron KIT 1 359.14 106 785 324 6
76 Kongsberg Automotive Holdings KOA 48 746.93 614 475 324 1
77 Kongsberg Gruppen KOG 229.93 226 887 324 1
78 Komplett Bank KOMP 2 300.78 71 374 324 24
79 Kværner KVAER 1 505.62 182 595 304 1
80 Leroy Seafood Group LSG 438.69 823 939 324 1
81 Medistim MEDI 192.30 39 410 324 42
82 Magnora MGN 1 869.92 42 986 319 133
83 MOWI MOWI 321.31 1 615 410 324 1
84 MPC Container Ships MPCC 3 218.22 66 549 324 52
85 Magseis Fairfield MSEIS 5 459.50 81 120 324 43
86 Multiconsult MULTI 546.48 10 694 321 219
87 Nordic Nanovector NANO 692.47 292 759 304 1
88 Napatech NAPA 1 999.57 70 674 324 57
89 Norwegian Air Shuttle NAS 3 963.82 2 533 570 324 2
90 Navamedic NAVA 924.53 10 274 324 214
91 NEL NEL 3 482.16 2 032 866 324 1
92 Next Biometrics Group NEXT 3 175.70 55 608 324 51
93 Norsk Hydro NHY 1 472.88 1 617 577 324 1
94 Nekkar NKR 4 583.89 28 919 324 184
95 Nordic Semiconductor NOD 521.55 447 947 324 1
96 Northern Drilling NODL 903.83 72 675 323 30
97 Norwegian Finans Holding NOFI 443.58 367 778 324 1
98 Norwegian Energy Co NOR 162.02 30 090 324 34
99 Norbit NORBIT 1 429.23 12 058 304 199
100 Norwegian Property NPRO 6 215.36 13 199 324 116
101 NRC Group NRC 733.98 70 459 324 10
102 Norway Royal Salmon NRS 117.85 167 658 324 1
103 NTS NTS 352.31 4 325 316 266
104 Ocean Yield OCY 653.89 216 859 324 1
105 Odfjell Ser. A ODF 1 417.37 6 920 320 173
106 Odfjell Ser. B ODFB 1 490.67 2 395 291 244
107 Odfjell Drilling ODL 1 436.79 184 918 324 1
108 Okea OKEA 1 089.78 20 915 324 122
109 Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap OLT 279.62 31 785 324 24
110 Orkla ORK 504.03 1 184 492 324 1
111 Otello Corp OTELLO 1 460.55 49 004 304 4
112 Oceanteam OTS 4 787.82 11 653 320 222
113 Pareto Bank PARB 804.77 46 204 324 81
114 PCI Biotech Holding PCIB 465.75 217 557 324 12
115 Panoro Energy PEN 1 711.91 119 822 324 1
116 PGS PGS 2 199.46 645 442 324 1
117 PhotoCure PHO 366.52 340 191 324 1
118 Polarcus PLCS 13 848.40 44 221 324 63
119 poLight PLT 324.75 101 132 324 65
120 Polaris Media POL 1 587.74 3 053 300 268
121 Protector Forsikring PROTCT 547.17 54 697 304 5
122 Prosafe PRS 3 104.34 69 652 324 121
123 Petrolia PSE 1 344.54 12 713 297 194
124 Questerre Energy Corp QEC 9 403.33 55 572 324 84
125 Q-Free QFR 2 948.97 11 399 312 199
126 Rak Petroleum RAKP 2 585.75 5 764 317 231
127 Reach Subsea REACH 5 130.17 11 407 306 239
128 REC Silicon REC 4 483.43 455 149 304 1
129 GC Rieber Shipping RISH 725.76 2 775 271 236
130 SalMar SALM 82.28 935 654 324 1
131 Salmones Camanchaca SALMON 1 428.90 3 820 295 238
132 SAS SAS 1 854.52 74 836 304 119
133 Sbanken SBANK 343.242 149 792 324 1
134 Star Bulk Carriers Corp. SBLK 322.30 8 186 223 161 Delisted from OSE 31.07.20. (10)
135 Selvaag Bolig SBO 322.40 102 447 324 1
136 SeaBird Exploration SBX 14 448.82 51 033 324 107
137 Schibsted Ser. A SCHA 95.38 836 126 323 2
138 Schibsted Ser. B SCHB 131.23 345 557 323 2
139 Seadrill SDRL 1 430.23 279 837 324 19
140 S.D Standard Drilling SDSD 18 228.04 31 755 324 83
# Company Ticker Average trade 
size







Table 9 (continued):    
 
  
141 Shelf Drilling SHLF 3 457.23 46 789 324 43
142 Siem Offshore SIOFF 3 512.74 4 528 284 230
143 Stolt-Nielsen SNI 171.10 55 933 324 1
144 Solstad Offshore SOFF 5 406.22 96 760 324 135
145 Solon Eiendom SOLON 1 768.19 13 927 324 84
146 SpareBank 1 SR Bank SRBANK 317.68 280 614 304 1
147 The Scottish Salmon Co SSC 2 464.47 19 706 130 20 Aquired by Bakkafrost 05.03.2020. (11)
148 Self Storage Group SSG 2 866.05 17 836 324 96
149 Scanship Holding SSHIP 1 246.78 36 789 92 0 Name changed to Vow (VOW) on 13.01.20. (12)
150 Scatec Solar SSO 260.21 731 706 324 1
151 Storebrand STB 572.32 1 196 615 324 1
152 Storm Real Estate STORM 1 852.20 7 544 296 266
153 StrongPoint STRONG 1 531.53 18 564 304 174
154 Subsea 7 SUBC 350.80 1 174 342 324 1
155 Team Tankers International TEAM 4 354.14 1 924 216 185 Delisted from OSE from 01.10.2020. (13)
156 Techstep TECH 3 780.32 14 645 324 189
157 Telenor TEL 442.29 1 341 730 324 1
158 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co TGS 167.53 984 027 324 1
159 Thin Film Electronics THIN 27 615.49 190 378 324 41
160 Tomra Systems TOM 135.45 1 023 084 324 1
161 Treasure TRE 2 396.00 5 792 313 243
162 Targovax TRVX 2 147.61 76 851 324 94
163 Ultimovacs ULTIMO 426.49 36 205 304 118
164 Veidekke VEI 317.53 155 230 324 1
165 Vistin Pharma VISTIN 1 975.70 36 662 304 131
166 Voss Veksel- og Ladmandsbank VVL 211.62 1 498 285 264
167 Wallenius Wilhelmsen WALWIL 947.29 165 521 304 1
168 Wilson WILS 709.24 1 102 214 209
169 Webstep WSTEP 1 781.59 5 356 305 224
170 Wilh. Wilhemsen Holding Ser. A WWI 250.25 16 710 324 93
171 Wilh. Wilhemsen Holding Ser. B WWIB 374.19 6 652 315 173
172 XXL XXL 1 176.87 468 218 324 1
173 Yara International YAR 163.12 1 448 826 324 1
























A.3 Fixed effects model without added trade 
Table 10: Panel regression with stock fixed effects for all stocks without adding one trade to all 
closing auctions. The log auction turnover, log turnover in the last 5 min of ordinary trading and log 
intraday turnover (09:00-16:15) are regressed on explanatory variables. 
 
Note: Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted as ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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A.4 Fraction of trades without outliers 
 
Figure 5: Outliers removed. From the top left corner, the first figure illustrates the fraction of aggregate 
daily NOK volume made between 10:00 and 16:15. The second figure shows the fraction of aggregate 
daily NOK volume made in the last 5 min of ordinary trading (16:15-16:20). The bottom left figure 
displays the fraction of aggregate daily NOK volume made in the closing auction and the last figure 
illustrates the fraction of aggregate daily NOK volume made in the first hour of trading (09:00-09:59). 
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A.5 Auction turnover - Welch two-sample t-test  
 
 
Figure 6: Results of the one-sided Welch two-sample t-tests for OSEBX – Remaining stocks (top) and 
OBX – Remaining stocks (bottom) on auction turnover.  
 
A.6 Price deviation statistics 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the auction price deviations in basis points. 
 
 
Mean 64.09 41.18 24.97 84.11
Median 29.62 22.56 16.89 42.62
StdDev 130.55 98.69 57.36 148.07
p0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p0.5 29.62 22.56 16.89 42.62
p0.8 88.42 55.71 36.01 126.58
p0.9 155.04 89.54 51.36 209.07
p0.95 242.93 134.59 71.99 306.28
Count 37 750 19 088 7 226 16 766
All OSEBX OBX Remaining 
stocks
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A.7 Price deviation - Welch two-sample t-test 
 
 
Figure 7: Results of the one-sided Welch two-sample t-tests for Remaining stocks – OSEBX (top) and 
Remaining stocks - OBX (bottom) on price deviation. 
 
